Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Theophrastus, Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G and Erik J. Olsson

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14 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative and the Limitation of Size [Rayo/Uzquiano]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / m. Axiom of Separation
Some set theories give up Separation in exchange for a universal set [Rayo/Uzquiano]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
We could have unrestricted quantification without having an all-inclusive domain [Rayo/Uzquiano]
Absolute generality is impossible, if there are indefinitely extensible concepts like sets and ordinals [Rayo/Uzquiano]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects [Rayo/Uzquiano]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson]
Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson]
Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson]
A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson]
Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
How can we state relativism of sweet and sour, if they have no determinate nature? [Theophrastus]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
The domain of an assertion is restricted by context, either semantically or pragmatically [Rayo/Uzquiano]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Theophrastus doubted whether nature could be explained teleologically [Theophrastus, by Gottschalk]